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Policy recommendations
\ Take sustainable measures to fight 
causes of displacement in the long term 
and to support voluntary return.
By supplying legal advice on conflicts about land rights 
and the depletion of resources, DC can contribute to 
creating legal certainty for IDPs and refugees again. 
DC can also help to expand existing health and educa-
tion infrastructure in those areas that have not been 
accessible to the government for a long time and that 
are controlled by armed groups. This infrastructure will 
benefit host communities, internally displaced people 
and refugees alike. 
 
\ Create holistic scenarios that also include 
the (transnational) mobility of refugees 
as a strategy of survival
Protracted displacement has led to transnational labour 
migration, diversification, networking and urbanization. 
DC needs realistic scenarios that not only include refu-
gee repatriation but also take into account social 
change. Binational training opportunities (for instance 
with Thailand) and labour market initiatives would 
open up sustainable income perspectives to refugees 
and migrants within the resprective country and con-
tribute to the economic development of both 
countries. 
\ Include monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms for the implementation of 
peace processes in development cooper-
ation project strategies on the situation 
of displacement in Myanmar.
Despite the fact that expectations associated with the 
transition process in Myanmar are high—they must 
not compromise a detailed and objective analysis of 
the current realities. Development cooperation (DC) 
project strategies aiming to solve protracted refugee 
situations in Myanmar and its neighbouring countries 
must continuously monitor which causes of displace-
ment continue to exist—unchanged or in a different 
form—to react adequately and flexibly on them. 
\ Make DC dependent on good governance, 
the protection of human rights as well as 
reintegration- or compensation measures
The framework prescribed by the Constitution and the 
currently prevailing power structures reinforce the 
marginalization of internally displaced people and re-
turnees in Myanmar. If the international community 
wants to adopt countermeasures, it must raise up the 
protection of human rights, reintegration and com-
pensation measures to binding indicators of success 
for its coordinated and coherent DC-measures.
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Summary
In the perception of the international community it 
was only a matter of time until, after the democratic 
turnaround in Myanmar, human rights violations 
would end, and refugees as well as internally dis-
placed people (IDPs) would return. The high hopes 
that rested on Aung San Suu Kyi, however, tended to 
blind observers to a critical and realistic assessment 
of the socio-political and constitutional framework 
left by the military. The daily lives of many people in 
Myanmar continue to be characterized by restricted 
civic rights, lack of state-run services, land grabbing, 
exacerbating armed clashes and faltering peace 
negotiations. 
To be able to find sustainable and long-term solutions 
for realities of protracted forced displacement in  
Myanmar and abroad, it is necessary to analyze chal-
lenges and options of development cooperation (DC) 
in Myanmar in detail rather than to impose sanc-
tions. Moreover, to modify the framework conditions 
in such a way that survival strategies that were 
formed when people were forced to flee their homes 
can be used as potential of development, donors need 
to develop international, regional and transboundary 
projects that are coordinated and developed bearing a 
participatory approach with local initiatives in mind.1 
Current political situation is far from 
peaceful
Since April 2016, the international community has 
been generously supporting the new government un-
der the National League for Democracy (NLD) in its 
efforts to overcome and terminate autocratic rule and 
military conflicts. The hopes that were associated 
with the election of the Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to become true with the 
21st Century Panglong Conference in August 2016. 
1 \  This Policy Brief is based on research conducted in Thailand and Myanmar 
between July 2016 and March 2018 in the framework of the research 
project “Protected rather than protracted - Strengthening refugees and 
peace”, supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (BMZ). We owe much to all individuals and 
institutions without whose support this research would not have been 
possible .
But only two months later, in October, the conflict in 
Rakhine State intensified so much that the UN Secu-
rity Council referred to the foced displacement of the 
Rohingya as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” 
(Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). With this, the 
security challenges of Myanmar were once again in 
the focus of international attention. 
The armed disputes between the Burmese Army and 
a number of armed ethnic militias, too, continue una-
bated in many parts of the country. Kachin and Shan 
State as well as recently parts of Karen State are par-
ticularly affected. The situation has even exacerbated 
as the decade-long divide-and-rule strategy of the 
military has deepened ethnic tensions and increased 
the fragmentation of the armed groups. Furthermore, 
the persecution of the Rohingya is not an exception. 
In fact, the discrimination of religious minorities 
that can currently be observed has become a symptom 
of a religious nationalism that has grown during mil-
itary rule and is since deeply embedded in the social 
structure of Myanmar. 
The efforts of the new democratic government to alle-
viate the negative consequences of its heritage from 
the military government have only been partially 
successful as they were neither able to stop the 
armed fighting nor bring all relevant parties together. 
The efforts of the international community to ease 
the conflict in Rakhine State by establishing the Kofi 
Annan Advisory Commission have also failed. This 
current example also shows that the room for ma-
noeuvre of the new government is severely hampered 
by the Constitution and the role of the military but 
also by domestic policy constraints, such as the reli-
gious-nationalist line of the NLD and its supporters. 
This is why it is necessary to part withthe belief that 
democratization and development happen automati-
cally and to carry out an in-depth analysis of the soci-
etal context of Myanmar. The ideology of the military 
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had not been detached from everyday life in Myanmar. 
It referred back to local patterns of thinking and in-
fluenced them over decades. Therefore, diverse traits 
of the junta policies are still present. They manifest in 
a) the political understanding of the structure and 
role of the state, b) nationality and the protection of 
minorities in civil society, c) the increasing fragmen-
tation of the armed groups fighting each other in the 
peripheral regions as well as d) the ideological self- 
image of the military and its close links to the admin-
istration that turn it into a state within a state.
Armed groups and protracted conflicts
In many parts of Myanmar, insecurity and continued 
fighting are an obstacle to return of IDPs and refu-
gees. After the democratic elections, the intensity of 
armed disputes increased markedly. The population 
from Kachin, for instance, that was affected by the 
conflict complained that its situation had not 
changed much. “We hear of peace talks but see some-
thing different: Soldiers, air raids, mines” (IDP, 
Bahmo, Kachin, September 2016). Even where the 
ceasefire is observed, the actions of the military do 
not instill trust in the people. In 
most cases, the army does not want 
to withdraw from its positions and 
is even increasing its presence in 
some areas. This is why the displaced 
often do not return but rather con-
tinue to observe the situation atten-
tively from a safe distance. 
Even the 21st Century Panglong 
Conference, named after the historic 
agreement of 1947 on the indepen- 
dence of Myanmar, did not change 
anything fundamentally. This con-
ference neither led to binding provi-
sions nor did it officially include im-
portant actors of the Northern 
Alliance Burma, formed later. It also 
did not address the conflict between 
Buddhist Arakan and the Muslim 
minority. This conflict escalated after 
border posts were attacked in October 
2016 for which the Islamist Rohingya 
militias were blamed. In summer 
2017, after further attacks on police 
and army posts, the situation deteri-
orated, such that more than 700,000 
individuals fled to neighbouring 
Bangladesh. 
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Current causes of displacement and  
obstacles to return: Forced recruitment, 
landmines, religious discrimination
Conflicts remain the main cause why people are 
forced to flee their homes in Myanmar. In northern 
Shan State, for instance, the number of armed militias 
has even increased in the recent past. In particular 
families with male adolescentsare concerned about 
the continuous presence of armed groups. Due to the 
fragmentation of ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the 
worsening of inter-ethnic fighting, forced recruitment 
has increased recently (interviews around Lahio,  
September 2016).  And this is the reason why people 
flee their homes and do not return. Another obstacle to 
return are landmines, particularly in Karen, Karenni 
and Kachin State. A short-term improvement is un-
likely as neither the army nor EAGs are prepared and 
willing to clear the areas of mines, which shows that 
both lack the trust in the ceasefire agreements. 
The established confusion of religious nationalism 
and exclusive access to civil rights aggravates recon-
ciliation between enemy groups—not only in the case 
of the Rohingya. Across the country, Muslims and 
Hindus report discrimination, for instance by laws to 
protect religion and race. In other conflicts, too, the 
military exploited religious divisions that had been 
reinforced further by fighting. In Karen State, the junta 
unilaterally backed Buddhist Karen and thus pro-
moted tensions between them and Christian parts of 
the population. In doing so, the military and the gov-
ernment lose more and more control over the genie 
that is out of the bottle. By now, the religious nation-
alism can no longer be attributed to individuals, such 
as the Buddhist priest Ashin Wirathu but has become 
a phenomenon that affects the entire population. 
Number of displaced people in Myanmar 
and abroad remains high
During the decades of autocratic rule, a large number 
of individuals fled armed conflicts between the Bur-
mese Army and a multitude of armed ethnic militias, 
either abroad or to locations in Myanmar. After the 
end of the military rule, this initially did not change 
much. At the time of writing, the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates the number of 
IDPs at 635,000 (IDMC GRID, 2018). Moreover, in 2016, 
560,832 individuals lived in Thailand under the man-
date of the UNHCR. While the number of registered 
individuals in the nine temporary camps along the 
Thai border decreased to 102,359 in March 2017, the 
number of refugees in Bangladesh, mainly Rohingya, 
increased in the same year by 693,000 (August 2017 to 
May 2018) to approx. 878,000. 2
In addition, natural disasters forced 509,000 (2016) 
and 351,000 (2017) people from their homes (IDMC 
GRID, 2018). Refugees, particularly from the rural areas 
of Myanmar, mention yet another cause of displace-
ment or obstacle to return, namely poor living condi-
tions, bad training opportunities and lacking health-
care. Forced relocations due to development projects, 
such as the Asia Highway, are usual practice. 
To be able to realistically judge the situation of the 
displaced and any sustainable approaches to protracted 
refugee situations, both the causes of displacement 
and the scale of displacement must be analyzed from 
a holistic perspective. The number of internally dis-
placed people and that of the refugees and not recog-
nized displaced outside of Myanmar is much higher 
than official figures would let one suspect. For Bang-
ladesh, for example, the already high numbers of data 
do not include individuals who live outside of camps 
or in host communities according to UNHCR. One 
has to add another 1.5 to five million Burmese who 
live there as labour migrants, guest students or illegal 
migrants to the officially listed refugees in Thailand. 3 
2 \  http://www.refworld.org/country,,UNHCR,,MMR,,590743874,0.html; 
UNHCR Global Report 2016, 2017; https://unhcr.maps.arcgis.com/apps/ 
Cascade/index.html?appid=5fdca0f47f1a46498002f39894fcd26f
3 \  "Three million Myanmar nationals working legally in Thailand and per-
haps as many as two million more are undocumented" (Herman, 2016).
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conditional on the compliance with certain indica-
tors of success. It is decisive here to prevent further 
and to punish existing human rights violations as 
well as to support reintegration and compensation 
measures. For this, the international community has 
to communicate these as a fundamental condition 
for cooperation and find innovative alternatives to bi-
lateral, state-centred cooperation, even if countries 
like China are ready to step in. Donor countries that 
want to support a human rights-based democratiza-
tion process should not only foster good governance 
but directly back non-state basic institutions and 
organizations.
A consistent combination of diplomatic pressure (in 
view of the implementation of recommendations of 
the Kofi Annan Commission) with more pronounced 
conditionalities of DC, which, for instance, support an 
equal share of the different ethnic and religious 
groups is necessary to sustainably multiply options 
for return. By the same token, alternatives to income 
opportunities from the in reality still existing, struc-
turally embedded market of violence must be gener-
ated. The broader the alliance of donors who commit 
to a corresponding code of conduct the higher the 
negative follow-on costs of practices such as forced 
displacement or land grabbing by armed actors. 
Take sustainable measures to fight 
causes of displacement in the long 
term and to support voluntary return
Displaced persons generally do not aspire a return to 
the status quo before their displacement but rather 
assess their outlook in comparison to their current 
situation. Besides the end of the armed conflict and 
the acute threat by armed groups as causes of forced 
displacement, most displaced people consider access 
to rights, health services and education decisive crite-
ria for (partial) return. These factors represent the  
basis for the development of an individual. To combat 
causes of displacement and to foster voluntary return, 
it is therefore vital for DC to take action in these areas. 
Include monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms for the implementation  
of peace processes in DC project strat-
egies on the situation of displacement 
in Myanmar
In hindsight, it must be said that many return sce-
narios overestimate the degree of transition. They do 
not take into consideration that some of the expecta-
tions of the military, armed groups, the government 
and the international community with regard to the 
autonomy of sub-regions or design of unity of the 
state are irreconcilable. For ethnic minorities, a feder-
ation of autonomous entities is the most basic condi-
tion in the negotiations. The army, conversely, sees its 
raison d’être in the defence of the union of Myanmar. 
Realistic scenarios must take into account that first, all 
sections of the population must be involved and, sec-
ond, their basis must have a say if agreements are to 
be considered as binding. 
Our study, conducted from mid-2016 to early 2018 (cf. 
Working Paper 1/2018) shows that for displaced persons 
to return, the implementation of the current peace 
process is decisive rather than mere political declara-
tions of intent. As long as there is fighting, human 
rights violations and people are forced to leave their 
homes, any prospects of voluntary return are small. A 
scaling down of the supply to the camps or even the 
closure of camps does not change much in this re-
spect.  Successful development cooperation (DC) proj-
ect strategies as a solution to the protracted refugee 
situation in Myanmar and its neighbouring countries 
must, therefore, continuously monitor whether (and 
which) causes of displacement remain unchanged or 
have changed to solve these if possible. 
Make DC conditional on good governance, 
the protection of human rights as well 
as reintegration- or compensation 
measures 
The international community ought to make meas-
ures that promote the transition and the peace pro-
cess or other DC projects it considers suitable 
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Such cooperation has the additional advantage that 
working together builds trust in one another. Wherever 
state-run education is accessible again, alternative 
structures change into additional options. Some  
‘ethnic’ schools have since then turned into afternoon 
schools. As teachers in Myanmar typically offer private 
(and thus fee-based) tutoring or additional lessons, 
pupils in peripheral border areas are at an advantage 
by virtue of informal mergers when it comes to English 
lessons, for instance. This combination of private  
and state-run agencies could serve as a country-wide 
model for the current school reform programme.
Create holistic scenarios that also in-
clude the (transnational) mobility of 
refugees as a strategy of survival
Rural exodus, urbanization, sounding out chances  
of access to livelihoods, services and rights beyond 
Myanmar’s border as well as the decade-long practice 
of labour migration resulting from this are no tempo-
rary phenomena. The thus created transnational di-
versification of work, education, place of residence 
and shifts in the understanding of one’s role and 
work distribution in families and networks are inter-
related with the peace and return processes. Therefore, 
realistic scenarios must take account of social change 
and must be geared to the real existing challenges. 
Foster bi-national training opportunities and labour 
market initiatives
There is a high demand for jobs in the agriculture, in-
dustrial and service sectors in Thailand. There, it is 
undisputed that host communities and displaced or 
migrants depend on one another in the labour mar-
ket. But the working conditions for refugees are pre-
carious, their current insecure legal situation facili-
tates different kinds of exploitation. To counter this, 
DC-measures ought to tie in with ASEAN efforts to in-
crease the mobility of persons and goods in the inter-
nal market.
Support the legalization of land titles
Many people in the country’s public administration 
and ministries responsible for land issues remain  
linked to the former military dictatorship. In current 
administrative practice, information on the rights of 
the civilian population that is passed on is either in-
complete or wrong; laws are only implemented selec-
tively. In concrete terms, competent officials refuse to 
survey and register land due to security concerns.
In the point of view of the displaced, there is hardly 
any difference whether access to land is refused due 
to formal bureaucratic obstacles or at the barrel of a 
gun. To also prevent a small military–economic elite 
instead of large parts of the rural population from 
profiting from the current process of rewriting land 
titles to collective land ownership, DC ought to sup-
port comprehensive legal assistance—as is currently 
offered by various NGOs.
Build up education and health sector by using  
existing structures
The structures of healthcare and education services 
in the periphery have grown over time against the 
background of central-state infrastructure. In the areas 
controlled by the militias and that have not been  
accessible to the government for a long time, an inde-
pendent health care and education infrastructure has 
developed with different training standards, curricula 
or languages used. For a large part of the local popula-
tion, this is the only way of receiving medical or edu-
cational support. Short- or medium-term care of the 
population can thus only be maintained if these ex-
isting structures are supported and, in the long run, 
transferred to federal structures. Host communities, 
internally displaced people and refugees would equally 
profit from such a dovetailing.
The experience Médecins Sans Frontières have made 
with the dissolution of (political) conflicts of interests 
in the health service in Shan State shows that it is 
worth supporting the merger of state and para-state 
services by DC to guarantee that basic needs are met. 
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The large majority of employers and consumers in 
Thailand as well as employees and business people 
from Myanmar would profit from the removal of  
administrative obstacles, in particular in the area of 
planning security, wages and prices. Bi-national 
training opportunities and labour market initiatives 
supported by DC would, furthermore, serve the need 
of workers and reduce grievances that refugees and 
migrants have suffered from for generations.
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